M. Laval’s Victory Once again M. LAVAL has won a remarkable victory in the French Chamber, though this time by a narrower margin than in any of the other crises which have threatened his Ministry. His speech in reply to his critics on Saturday, the second day of the debate, was a great achievement, undoubtedly turning in his favour the tide of opinion which had been running heavily against him. There were several other notable speeches in the course of a very frank debate. On the whole the result should be to improve the outlook for cooperation by the two countries in the maintenance of peace by collective security. M. LAVAL’S opening speech on Friday explaining the origin of the Paris peace proposals, which he admitted were now dead, had been coldly received. The majority of the Chamber felt, it was clear, that he had been too lukewarm in his support of the League and too ready to seek to buy off the aggressor at the victim’s expense. Effective attacks upon his handling of the affair had been made by M. DELBOS, who accused him of for- getting that the prime objective of French policy must be to strengthen the League, and by M. PAUL REYNAUD. M. REYNAUD declared that France to-day had to choose between Italy, who had broken the Covenant, and Great Britain, who was its guardian, and that only by cooperat- ing with Great Britain in a system of collective security could France protect herself against the danger of unprovoked attack. M. DELBOS is chairman of the Socialist Radical group of Depu- ties holding the key position in the Chamber, and including no fewer than five members of M. LAVAL’S composite Ministry, M. HERRIOT among them. M. PAUL REYNAVD, an ex-Minister of Finance, belongs to the Right. These two speeches and, still more, the applause which they evoked seemed likely to determine the fate of the Government. The situation was only saved by the detailed and resourceful explanation of his policy which M. LAVAL gave in his second speech. Those parts of the speech which had most effect upon the Chamber were his r-ply to the charge that he had been too late in warning Italy of the consequences of her Abyssinian adventure, and his account of the assurances which he had given Great Britain of support in case of an attack by Italy and of the consulta- tions between the naval, military, and air staffs of the two countries which had followed those assurances. He had been accused of having given SIGNOR MUSSOLINI a free hanid in Abyssinia when he negotiated the Franco- Italian agreement of last January. This he denied categorically. All that he had done had been to undertake that France would refrain from seeking economic concessions in one part of Abyssinia in return for a similar undertaking by Italy with regard to another part. He had never at any moment encouraged a warlike enterprise: on the contrary, so far back as last July the FRENCH AMBASSADOR in Rome had been instructed to call SIGNOR MUSSOLINI’s attention to the embarrassment in which France would be placed by an attack upon Abyssinia. And since then he had repeatedly warned Italy that France would remain faithful to the Covenant and respect the obligations which it imposed upon her. This was not the only passage of his speech in which he betrayed some annoyance with the Italians. He spoke of the ” regrettable ” wireless broadcasts, newspaper articles, and movement of troops in Libya, which had caused anxiety in England. In his earlier speech he had referred pointedly to the failure of the Italian Government ” to bring to the examina- ” tion of our suggestions the diligence and the “comprehension which we had the right to “expect” and to SIGNOR MUSSOLINI’S speech at Pontinia which ” did not make our task any ” easier.” His account of how the peace pro- posals came into being tallies closely with that given by SIR SA.MUEL HOARE in the House of Commons, and there was the same omission to explain how a settlement which so plainly put a premium upon military aggression could be reconciled with the spirit of the Covenant or with the maintenance of collective security. As to the future, M. LAvAL assured the Chamber that support of the League, in cooperation with Great Britain, would remain the fundamental basis of French policy. France would continue to apply the methods of economicand financial pressure upon which the League had agreed. An oil embargo, he claimed, would only become practicable if the United States took similar action, which could not be until after Congress meets next month. When the time came he would be willing to submit the question for decision to the Chamber. But the failure of the peace pro- posals would not discourage him from pursuing within the framework of the League the task of restoring peace by conciliation. Unquestionably this is one of the two main duties of the League. The pity is that a premature and misconceived effort at concilia- tion has made that side of its twofold task more difficult than it was before. The whole matter is now back again in the hands of the League itself. The essential is that its collective action should be made effective; for, if not, collective security must remain a myth. As M. LAVAL has pointed out, the methods of pressure already adopted are far from negligible, though time will be n.ia2 f^- ‘o *0 produce their full effect. Whether and how this pressure should be intensified are questions not of prin- ciple but of expediency, upon which there mav be differences of opinion. What is vital is that the League should be united in support of what- ever decisions are taken. The unity of the member-States is the one means of ensuring that the present conflict shall remain localized and of strengthening the power of mediation when the time comes. In this respect the out- look has been not a little clarified by the debates ih London and in Paris. M. LAVAL’S speech was not confined to the Abyssinian question. He reviewed the relations of France with Great Britain, with Germany, and with Russia, passing under review the whole European situation, emphasizing throughout his de- termination not to assume any commit- ments outside the general framework of European security. French agreements with other countries, he said, must pass through the League of Nations or end there. He had hoped that successful mediation in the Abyssinian dispute might be followed by a successful en- deavour by France and Great Britain to bring Germany back into the collective organization. A Franco-German rapprochement has indeed always been an essential condition for confident international cooperation in constructive peace. The stronger and more effective the League can be made the greater the probability of such a develonment M. LAVAL’S VICTORY